took place behind a Chinese wall separating the 'public side' proprietary traders from the 'private side' advisory team) did not, on the facts, give rise to any conflict of interest and duty that would have offended the fiduciary proscription. His Honour went on to find that, even if the trading had given rise to a conflict, the client's fully informed consent to the existence of that conflict could have been implied from the all the circumstances of the dealing between the bank and the client.
Had the decision been otherwise, the concerns of the international investment banking community that the Australian regulator had upset a widespread (but not inevitable) practice in financial conglomerates of combining advisory businesses with equities trading businesses would have been realised. Instead the decision of Jacobson J has confirmed that this practice is not prohibited by equity, provided the relationship between the bank and the client, and the organisation of the conglomerate's business, conforms to certain conventions.
The purpose of this paper is to unpack the conflicts element of the decision, to see what its ramifications might be for investment banks whose operations encompass both advisory and trading arms. It begins with a brief outline of the case, including a discussion of how it was that the financial services regulator came to bring an action based on (private law) fiduciary principles, and of the relationship between the conflicts elements and allegations of insider trading (which the regulator also failed to establish) that were tied up with them. It goes on to look in some more detail at Jacobson J's specific findings in relation to: firstly, the allegation that the relationship between the bank and its client was fiduciary; secondly, the allegation that the bank's proprietary trading gave rise to a conflict of interest and duty; and thirdly, the allegation that the client's informed consent had not been obtained. It then discusses briefly the role of Chinese walls in the management of conflicts. It concludes with some observations about the broader implications of the decision for the application of fiduciary principles to advisory firms and for the (specifically Australian) regulatory landscape. In so doing it draws attention to the complex interplay in commercial relationships between the common law duties and equitable principles, and between the equitable principles inter se, to which Lord Millet refers. As the discussion shows, that complexity is increased by the introduction of a third element, not mentioned by Lord Millet, which is the co-opting of equitable principles into the (public) regulation of financial services firms.
The case against Citigroup
The defendant in the Federal Court proceedings was a company called Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (Citigroup). Citigroup is the main operating subsidiary in Australia of Citigroup Inc, the global banking and financial services company. Citigroup carries on various businesses in Australia, including a business known internally as the Corporate and Investment Bank (CIB). The CIB in turn includes a number of operating divisions, one of which is the Investment Banking Division (IBD) which provides advisory services and investment banking services (including in connection with mergers and acquisitions), and another of which (known as Equities) engages in proprietary trading in securities.
The Patrick takeover
On 8 August 2005, Citigroup's IBD was retained by a subsidiary of an Australian listed company called Toll Holdings Limited (Toll) to provide financial advisory and investment banking services to it in relation to a proposed takeover by Toll of another listed company, Patrick Corporation Limited (Patrick). Toll had been considering a takeover of Patrick for some months, as a means of entering the Australian ports logistics market. The transaction was a sizable one (valued at over AUD 4.5 billion on completion) and the parties were highly sophisticated. Toll appointed two investment banks to advise it in relation to the bid, of which Citigroup was one and the boutique Carnegie Wylie & Co Pty Limited (Carnegie Wylie) was the other.
Under the terms of the retainer executed on 8 August, Citigroup's IBD fees for successful completion of the takeover were likely to be in the range of AUD 10 to 18 million.
Citigroup's IBD and Equities divisions were separated by formal information and other barriers known in the financial services sector as 'Chinese walls'. Employees working in the IBD division were on the private side of the wall, because they were routinely in possession of non-public price sensitive information about securities (including, in this instance, information about Toll's intentions in relation to Patrick). Chinese wall was adequate to repel an allegation of insider trading at the company level.
The conflicts claims
We now turn to look in some more detail at the nature of the conflicts claims made by ASIC against Citigroup.
As noted above, the essence of the conflicts claims was that Citigroup had breached certain parts of the Australian financial services laws in that it had breached a fiduciary duty owed by it to Toll to avoid conflicts of interest and duty.
ASIC said that this alleged breach of fiduciary duty by Citigroup:
• meant that Citigroup did not 'have in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities undertaken by [Citigroup] In order to establish the second of these things, ASIC had (at least in respect of one part of its case) to go one step further and establish that, because it was in a fiduciary relationship with Toll, Citigroup owed Toll a positive duty to disclose all matters relevant to its mandate of which it was aware. Such a duty was said by ASIC to be derived from the observations of Brennan J in the High Court of Australia in Daly v
The Sydney Stock Exchange Limited (1986) 160 CLR 371 at 385.
Jacobson J decided against ASIC on all of these issues. The reasons why, and the wider implications of his Honour's findings, are explored below.
Issue 1 -the fiduciary point
In order to succeed in the conflicts claims, ASIC had to establish first that the relationship between Citigroup and Toll was fiduciary in character. In this regard his The gravamen of ASIC's case is that for the exclusion of the fiduciary relationship in the mandate letter to be effective, it was incumbent upon Citigroup to draw Toll's attention expressly to the effect of the exclusion, that is, that it permitted Citigroup to trade in Patrick shares on its own account, in potential conflict with the interests of Toll…
The substance of Citigroup's answer to the claim is that the duty of a fiduciary to obtain the informed consent of a client has no application here because it presupposes the existence of an antecedent fiduciary relationship.
No such pre-existing relation is claimed to have been created.
By framing its case in this way, ASIC created (essentially) two sub-issues. The first is whether, but for the contractual stipulation to the contrary, the relationship would have been fiduciary. The second is whether, and if so on what basis, the contractual stipulation is effective to prevent a fiduciary relationship arising between the parties. … a fiduciary relationship is said to be founded upon a contract, the ordinary rules of construction of contracts apply. Thus, whether a part is subject to fiduciary obligations, and the scope of any fiduciary duties, is to be determined by construing the contract as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties and the purpose and object of the transaction: see Pacific Carriers Limited v BNP Paribas (2004) In light of that conclusion, the key consideration for Jacobson J was how the contractual stipulation in the mandate letter (to the effect that the relationship was not fiduciary) should be treated in construing the contract between Citigroup and Toll. The relationship between a financial adviser and its client, if it is fiduciary at all (see above), is not one of the established categories of fiduciary relationship.
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Accordingly, his Honour found that the principle that the client's fully informed consent to the exclusion or modification of the fiduciary duties was required had no application. Instead, as the mandate letter was to be interpreted in accordance with ordinary principles of contract, the contractual stipulation should be given its full effect in the absence of some contractual flaw like mistake or misrepresentation.
15 ASIC disavowed the existence of a fiduciary relationship pre-dating the actual execution of the that it failed to establish the Toll had the interest alleged (that is, an interest that the price of Patrick shares should not rise during trading on 19 August). In essence, this was because an earlier date (26 July) had already been selected as the reference date for the bid -that is, as the appropriate date from which to measure the premium (see [399] ). Accordingly ASIC failed to establish that 'noise' in the Patrick price on the last business day before the bid was material to Toll in relation to the calculation of the bid premium.
The fifth allegation of conflict seems, on the basis of his Honour's observation at [413] , to be the strongest, although it ultimately failed at a factual level (at [416] ).
The allegation relates to the position in which Citigroup found itself in the afternoon and evening of 19 August, when members of its senior management and compliance teams became aware of Citigroup's substantial proprietary shareholding in Toll.
The allegation made by ASIC is that Citigroup's interest in the price of Patrick shares conflicted at this point with its duty to provide disinterested and loyal advice to Toll.
As his Honour goes on to note at [412]:
The pleaded case is confined by the particulars. Two risks are asserted. The first is that Citigroup had an interest in preserving its reputation free from a perception that its Chinese walls had failed. The second is that the senior management might be required to make a decision as to whether the bid price should be increased. It is said that this could occur if [the IBD team leader] or Toll sought senior management's view as to the issue of the bid price.
The reason the claim failed was because his Honour found that there was 'no evidence to support that allegation that there was a risk that' the views of senior management on the bid price would be sought.
Issue 3 -informed consent
Having concluded that the relationship between Citigroup and Toll was not fiduciary, and that even if it was there was no conflict of interest and duty, Jacobson J was not required to decide whether Toll had given informed consent to Citigroup's proprietary trading activities. Nevertheless his Honour does go on to conclude that Toll's informed consent to Citigroup's proprietary trading could be implied from the circumstances.
As noted (in relation to issue 1) above, the question of informed consent arises in relation to two separate aspects of the judgment. The first relates to whether informed consent was required and obtained to the inclusion of the contractual stipulation in the mandate letter that excluded a fiduciary relationship between the parties. His Honour held on this point that informed consent was not required because the relationship was not fiduciary at the time the mandate letter was signed (noting that ASIC pleaded that the fiduciary relationship arose out of the mandate letter and did not pre-date it). This is discussed above.
The second relates to (the obiter question of) whether informed consent was obtained to Citigroup being in a position of conflict as a result of its proprietary trading in Patrick shares.
The broader context for this second consideration of the nature of informed consent is that a fiduciary is not prohibited from being in a position of conflict, or from profiting from its office, if it has the fully informed consent of the person to whom its duty is The point Jacobson J makes in relation to the consent is that there must be actual consent. That consent may be express or implied -here it was implied from the dealings between the parties. His Honour expressly (and rightly, it is submitted) distinguishes this from the situation in Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205, where the contract between a real estate agent and its client was held to include an implied term allowing the agent to act for other principals selling similar properties. That term was implied by Lord Browne-Wilkinson (at 214) because the practice is notorious and it would otherwise be impossible for real estate agents to perform their ordinary business functions. Jacobson J is at pains to point out that this is not the case here: he says (at [360] ) that 'there is nothing in the relationship of investment banker/financial adviser and client which requires a conclusion that it is an inherent part of the business of investment banking for the banker to engage in trading in its client's target's shares'. Accordingly the client's actual (albeit implied) consent is required.
18 For example, in Consul Developments Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 at 377, McTiernan J notes that 'if after full and frank disclosure of all material facts to the person to whom such a duty … is owed and permission has been given to make a profit for himself out of transactions which would otherwise be in breach of duty he is, of course, absolved from any obligation to account'.
Issue 4 -conflicts management and Chinese walls
The discussion of issues 1, 2 and 3, above, deals with the core fiduciary arguments on which ASIC's case was based. We now move to consider a related issue, which arises out of the statutory obligation on financial services firms to manage conflicts of interest. In essence, that issue is: do Chinese walls work as a means of managing conflicts of interest?
The answer to that broader question, at least in the context of the Citigroup case, is complicated by the particular statutory context in which it arises. Under Australian law, people who carry on a business of providing financial services are required to hold an AFS licence; Citigroup held such a licence. Among other things, the Corporations Act provides (at s 912A(1)(aa)) that an AFS licensee must 'have in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities undertaken by the licensee or a representative of the licensee in the provision of financial services as part of the financial services business'. This is one of the statutory provisions on which ASIC's civil proceedings against Citigroup were based.
ASIC's case against Citigroup was that Citigroup had breached this duty by having breached a fiduciary duty owed by it to Toll. Having failed to establish that the relationship was fiduciary, ASIC necessarily failed to establish a breach of s 912A(1)(aa). Jacobson J notes at [422] that ASIC did not concede that as a matter of construction the obligation in s 912A(1)(aa) only applies to a licensee who occupies a fiduciary position. However, ASIC did concede that in the present case that is how the conflict is said to arise. That is, the subsection is not engaged unless Citigroup and Toll were in a fiduciary relationship.
In fact, s 912A(1)(aa) did not apply to Citigroup in this context: see [440] . The reason for this is that investment banking is expressly excluded from being treated as the provision of a financial service for the purposes of the Corporations Act, by Adequate arrangements require more than a raft of written policies and procedures. They require a thorough understanding of the procedures by all employees and a willingness and ability to apply them to a host of possible conflicts.
This is an important caution.
Implications for advisers
Jacobson J's decision in ASIC v Citigroup does not in any way fundamentally change our understanding of the legal position of investment banks providing advisory services to sophisticated clients. Nevertheless his Honour does make a number of findings about the application of fiduciary duties to investment banks that are of significance for them and for other corporate advisers.
The first is that, but for the contractual stipulation that it was not, Jacobson J would have been inclined to treat the relationship between Citigroup and Toll as fiduciary.
The second is that a provision in a contract to the effect that the relationship created by the contract is not, and is not understood by either party to be, fiduciary should be effective to exclude a fiduciary relationship, so long as there is no mistake or misrepresentation or other contractual flaw. The fully informed (as distinct from ordinary contractual) consent of the affected party to the inclusion of such a provision is not required where the relationship is not one of the established categories of fiduciary relationship (such as agent and principal or trustee and beneficiary) and it cannot be shown (or, as in this case, it is not alleged) that a fiduciary relationship arose from the pre-contractual dealings between the parties.
The third is that where the relationship between the parties is one of the accepted fiduciary relationships or their pre-contractual dealings gave rise to fiduciary obligations, the fully informed consent of the affected party to the inclusion of a provision limiting or removing the fiduciary proscriptions would be required.
The fourth is that equity will only prohibit a fiduciary from having an interest that conflicts with a duty owed by the fiduciary to the client where the nature of the interest, the extent of the duty, and the impact of the interest on the duty can be clearly demonstrated.
The fifth is that, where equity requires a person's informed consent to a relaxation or exclusion of the fiduciary proscriptions, that consent can be express or implied.
Actual consent (whether express or implied) is required unless the state of affairs giving rise to the alleged conflict is notorious and is inherent to the fiduciary's ordinary business, in which case courts will imply into the arrangement a term permitting that state of affairs to exist.
The sixth is that an effective Chinese wall, combined with the consent of the client to a fiduciary carrying on operations behind that wall that would otherwise have contravened the fiduciary proscriptions, will protect a financial conglomerate from allegations of breach of its duties of loyalty to the client. another, or to act prudently, are not fiduciary obligations. According to Dawson and Toohey JJ (at 93) , what the law extracts from a fiduciary relationship is loyalty, often of an uncompromising kind, but no more than that. Gaudron and McHugh JJ (at 113) held that a fiduciary is obliged not to obtain any unauthorised benefit from the relationship and not to be in a position of conflict, but 'the law of this country does not otherwise impose positive legal duties on the fiduciary to act in the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed'. Gummow J (at 137) said that the special position of the trustee does not provide a proper foundation for 'the imposition upon fiduciaries in general of a quasi-tortious duty to act solely in the best interests of their principals'. Fiduciary obligations often arise in cases where one person is under an obligation to act in the interests of another, but that does not mean that the obligation to act in the interests of another is a fiduciary obligation.
While the existence of a duty on one person to act in the interests of another person might be a necessary pre-condition for finding that the relationship between them is fiduciary, it is not a sufficient condition on its own. Nor, as Austin J points out, is the duty itself a fiduciary duty. A person might have undertaken to act in the interests of another person, giving rise to a duty in contract or in equity to do so. However as Jacobson J concludes in Citigroup (at [272] ), the relationship between them will only be fiduciary if that person 'has undertaken to act in the interests of another and not in his or her own interests' (emphasis added). Even then 'all the facts and circumstances must be carefully examined to see whether the relationship is, in substance, fiduciary'. So for a relationship to be fiduciary there needs to be an expectation not only that one person will act in the interests of another, but also that they will subsume or sacrifice their own interests to do so.
Implications for regulation
In addition to its implications for advisers, the decision in ASIC v Citigroup obviously has implications for Australia's financial services regulation.
In commencing proceedings against Citigroup, it seems that ASIC was not primarily concerned with protecting the interests of Toll. Had it wished to complain about Citigroup's proprietary trading in Patrick shares, Toll presumably had sufficient resources of its own to do so. In fact, it appears from Jacobson J's judgment that Toll had no complaint (or at least no complaint that it wished to air in court); the evidence of Toll's Chief Financial Officer indicated that Toll understood that Citigroup would engage in proprietary trading, and had no objection so long as Citigroup did not misuse Toll's confidential information.
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Accordingly ASIC appears to have been acting in pursuit of a broader aim, directed at the integrity of the capital markets and of the actions of those who participate in them.
In its press release issued on 31 March 2006 when the proceedings were commenced, ASIC's Deputy Chairman said 'this is a significant case raising two very important issues for the securities industry: having adequate arrangements for managing inside information and dealing with conflicts of interest'. ASIC's intention appears to have been force some change to existing investment banking practice (with which Citigroup was complying) in relation to these areas.
As is clear from Jacobson J's judgment (from which ASIC has since indicated it will not appeal), ASIC's case in these areas was weak. Indeed, in terms of a case to test important principles about conflicts of interest and inside information, it could be characterised as poorly chosen and run. In particular, the case does little to enhance our understanding of the application of s 912A (1) has sought to rely on a (private) fiduciary principle to achieve a (public) regulatory aim. The reason why this does not work is that fiduciary principles are applied having regard to the particular understanding and circumstances of the parties to the relationship, not to broader considerations about market integrity. If, as in the Citigroup case, the parties agree that the fiduciary proscriptions should not apply, or should apply in a limited way, then a Court will accept this, unless a statute expressly prevents contracting out of or limiting the fiduciary duties. 24 As Professor John
Langbein has observed in relation to fiduciary principles in trust law (and this is equally true of fiduciary relationships based on contracts):
Despite decades of pulpit-thumping rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations, fiduciary duties in trust law are unambiguously contractarian. The rules of trust fiduciary law mean to capture the likely understanding of the parties to the trust deal, which is why both the duty of loyalty and the duty of prudence yield to the more particularized intentions that the parties may choose to express or imply in their trust deal.
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The private law, contractarian nature of fiduciary duties in a commercial context make them a poor platform for the erection of regulatory structures that have interests other than those of the parties at their heart.
Melbourne, Australia
July 2007 24 In a sense, this is the effect of s 182 and 183 and Pt 2D.1, Div 2 of the Corporations Act in relation to a director's fiduciary duties to his or her company.
